International Law Studies - Volume 61
Role of International Law and an Evolving Ocean Law
Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore (editors)

293

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION AT SEA
Wilfred A. Hearn
For almost three hundred years, the
law of the sea has been controlled by
two opposing concepts, namely: the
doctrine of frcedom of the seas, which
proclaims that the seas are open to all
nations on an cqual basis; and the
doctrine which recognizes that the
coastal State may exercise jurisdiction
and control over the marginal area in
order to enforce its fiscal, customs, and
sanitary laws, and to meet its defensive
needs.
These two concepts would be in
hopeless conflict if reasoned to their
logical extremes. Notwithstanding, they
have coexisted over the years without
doing violence to each other. This was
achieved because of the general view
that the high seas, which are common to
all nations, should not be appropriated
to the exclusive control of any single
State beyond that which is strictly
necessary to meet a State's essential
needs.
But the emphasis has been shifting in
recent years. It has become the tendency for individual States, acting unilaterally and without the consent or the
acquiescence of other States, to lay
claim to vast areas of the sea abutting
their coasts. These claims, if valid, effectively deny to all of the nations of the
world the free use of vital areas of the
sea. If invalid, they constitute a cloud
upon the right of other nations to
navigate these seas, and thereby breed

international incidents. In either event
they do violence to the fundamental
principle of freedom of the seas, and
establish what may be an ever-increasing
threat to sea communications among
nations.
Thus, the principles which we will
discuss this morning are not relics of the
past, without current interest or purpose; rather, they are very much alive
today, and, in many instances very
much in controversy. These same rules
of international law are now being
studied by some 75 nations in preparation for a world conference which will
convene early next year. This conference, which is sponsored by the
United Nations, will attempt to codify
the law of the sea. The conference will
have before it the draft articles on the
law of the sea, which have been prepared by the International Law Commission.
A great deal of work is underway in
the Executive Branch of our own Government in preparation for this conference. The Navy has been designated
Executive Agent for the Department of
Defense. The Judge Advocate General
of the Navy is the Defense Representative on the Interdepartmental Committee, which will coordinate the interests of all government agencies. A
working group, consisting of representatives of the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Judge Advocate General, has
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been studying each draft article in the
preparation of the Department of Defense position, based upon the interests
of national defense. Teams of naval
officers have visited many friendly foreign countries and explained to military
and foreign office officials the strategic
considerations in support of a narrow
territorial sea. Two naval officers have
just returned from briefing all naval
commands and the senior naval officer
of all NATO commands in the European
and Mediterranean areas.
These intense and thorough preparations reflect our concern over the threat
to the doctrine of freedom of the seas
which is abroad in the world today. This
doctrine is generally accepted to mean
that the high seas are open to all
nations, and that no nation may subject
any part of it to its sovereignty. It
includes, among other things, freedom
of navigation on the high seas and
freedom to fly over the high seas.
The strength of the Navy is measured
in part by the mobility of our fleets and
air arms and in the ability of fleets to
disperse over vast areas of the sea if
threatened by atomic attack. We are
vitally concerned, therefore, with the
freedom to maneuver in all of the seas
of the world and in any proposed
changes to the rules of international law
which would restrict that freedom.
It has been said that the Navy is the
precision instrument of national power
because of its ability to move rapidly
into troubled areas without crossing
frontiers and, yet, get close enough to
the trouble to show that we can apply
force, if necessary. It has the further
psychological advantage of possessing
massive striking power which may be
employed or held back without previous
disclosure of its intentions. As Admiral
Burke stated in a recent interview,
"When the fleet moves in and shows its
flag, it gives pause to an aggressor. " The
Sixth Fleet has demonstrated this point
in the Suez and Jordan crises. The very
presence of the Sixth Fleet in the

eastern end of the Mediterranean on
those occasions was a show of force
which is credited by many as having
deterred Communist aggression. The
Seventh Fleet has been equally effective
as a deterrent to aggression in the
western Pacific.
An important factor contributing to
these results has been our freedom to
move into the areas of the sea where
there could be in fact a show of force.
This right is being threatened by the
claims of many States which would
close off vast areas of the open sea to
our forces.
International law recognizes that the
coastal States have a variety of interests
and rights in the sea. That part of the
sea which is termed "landlocked" (such
as San Francisco Bay) is considered to
be internal water and an integral part of
the coastal State. Once an arm of the
sea has been recognized as internal
water, it moves outside the sphere of
international law and becomes wholly
within the jurisdiction of the coastal
State, except for the rules to be applied
in determining its outer limits.
The territorial sea is recognized as an
area over which the coastal State has
sovereignty. In effect, it is as though the
territory of the coastal State has been
extended to the outer limit of this
marginal belt. Within these limitsexcept for the right of innocent passage
-the coastal State has absolute sovereignty over the subsoil, the sea-bed, the
water above the sea-bed, the living
resources in the water, and the air space
above the water.
This principle was developed in
recognition of the needs of the coastal
State to control a maritime belt in order
to insure its well-being. It evolved as a
consequence of world acceptance of the
Grotius theory that the seas were open
to all. But, because the principle of
sovereignty over an area of the sea was
in derogation of the more compelling
principle of freedom of the seas, sovereignty was asserted initially only to the
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extent necessary to meet the essential
requirements. By the beginning of the
nineteenth century, a territorial sea of
one marine league (or three nautical
miles), as claimed by the maritime
nations of the world, had become established as a part of customary intern ationallaw.
The adherence of the United States
Government to the three-mile rule was
first announced in 1793, when Mr.
Jefferson, as Secretary of State, informed the British and French officials
that the United States would confine
the enforeement of certain orders to an
area not more than one league (or three
miles) from the shore. This position has
been restated ilnd reaffirmed on many
occasions in diplomatic notes, Acts of
Congress, and decisions of the Supreme
Court; and it is the position of the
United States today.
But the jurisdiction of the coastal
State does not end at the outer limits of
the territorial sea for all purposes. In a
contiguous area of the high seas, the
coastal State may exercise a limited
jurisdiction or control in relation to
customs, sanitation, and fiscal matters.
The United States first asserted the right
to enforce its customs laws within a
zone twelve miles from the coast by an
Act of Congress in 1790. Legislation for
this purpose has been in effect ever
since, and is in effect today. Our pioneering in this field has led to universal
recognition of such a practice. It is now
well settled that a State may exercise
authority on the high seas in order to
secure itself from injury and to give
effectiveness to the jurisdiction which it
exercises within its own territory. It is
important to note that the right of the
coastal State to exercise a limited control of jurisdiction in the contiguous
zone does not change the character of
the high seas nor confer any right of
sovereignty or general jurisdiction over
any area outside the territorial sea.
Another example of the exercise of
limited control beyond the territorial

sea is the air defense identification
zones, which are maintained by the
United States and Canada. Here, we
have two coastal States imposing certain
identification and control requirements
on foreign aircraft entering these zones,
which, off the east coast of the United
States, extend some 300 miles to sea.
These controls are exercised in the
interest of national security. Clearly,
under the fundamental principle of selfdefense, a State in times of peace as well
as in times of war may take reasonable
measures to protect its national security, even though these measures take
place upon the high seas. I think that
the comments of Mr. Elihu Root were
very much in point when he stated that
every sovereign state has a right to
protect itself by preventing a condition
of affairs in which it would be too late
to protect itself.
It is interesting to note that the
establishment of these identification
zones has not resulted in a single protest. Furthermore, all nations engaged in
international air commerce in the North
American areas are cooperating in the
enforcement of the regulations.
The regime of the continental shelf
recognizes in coastal States certain
rights in the sea-bed and in the subsoil
beneath the high seas. The Truman
Proclamation of 1945, which was one of
the earliest pronouncements on this
subject, announced this doctrine as
recognized by the United States. It
announced that the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to
the coasts of the United States as
appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.
This concept was quickly accepted
by the Family of Nations. Mr. Lauterpacht, writing in 1950, stated that
seldom has an apparent major change in
international law been accepted by
peaceful means more rapidly and with
more general acquiescence and approval
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than is the case of claim to the resources
of the continental shelf.
Because of the newness of this doctrine, however, international law relating to the continental shelf must be
considered in a state of development.
Consequently, there are questions which
can be foreseen but for which there are
no immediate answers. One such question reserved for future resolution is the
outer limit of the continental shelf. The
International Law Commission proposes
that the continental shelf be considered
as extending out to the IOO-fathom
curve, or beyond that limit to where the
depth of the water admits the exploitation of the natural resources. No substantial objection to this proposal
appears to have been expressed, and
perhaps it represents the best rule which
can be devised at this time.
Another question which is eventually
to occur concerns the possible conflict
between the demands of navigation in
the waters above the continental shelf
and the obstructions which are created
in order to exploit its natural resources.
There have been suggestions that
shipping be routed through specific
channels in order to prevent interference with the exploitation of the
natural resources. These suggestions
have been opposed on the grounds that
such action would be in derogation of
the character of the waters as high seas.
Equally objectionable-for the same
reason-would be a proposal that the
exploitation of resources of the continental shelf and the rights of navigation,
fishing, and conservation be placed
upon equal footing.
It is important to note that the
language of the Truman Proclamation
limits the claim of the United States to
the sea-bed and the subsoil and disclaims expressly any control in the
waters above the continental shelf. It is
evident that this language was chosen
with great care in order to dispel the
idea of any claim of sovereignty to
either the subsoil of the sea-bed of the

continental shelf, or the superjacent
waters.
After stating that the United States
regards the natural resources of the
sea-bed and the subsoil of the continental shelf as being under its jurisdiction
and control, the Proclamation provides
specifically as follows: "The character
as high seas of the water above the
continental shelf and the right to their
free and unimpeded navigation are in no
way thus affected. "
Notwithstanding the clarity of this
language, claims have been made by
other States, relying upon the Truman
Proclamation as a precedent, which
state that the continental shelf and the
waters thereon are subject to the sovereign powers of the coastal State. The
United States has informed each of
these claimants that it could not recognize sovereignty of the coastal State
over the continental shelf and over seas
adjacent to its coast outside the generally recognized limits of the territorial
sea.
Notwithstanding the rights which a
State may exercise beyond the territorial sea-that is, the right to exploit
the natural resources of the continental
shelf and the right to exercise a limited
jurisdiction over adjacent waters for
such purposes as defense, customs, fiscal
matters-there is the view, strongly supported in some quarters, that a coastal
State should be entitled to exercise
sovereignty over vast areas of the sea.
Those who support this position, Russia
among others, consider the question one
of domestic concern, and believe that
international law does not prohibit a
coastal State from extending the
breadth of its territorial sea to meet
what it considers to be its domestic
needs, without regard to the interests or
the needs of the Community of Nations
and without their acquiescence or consent.
Acting in accordance with this view,
a number of States have extended their
claim of sovereignty to various limits.
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The most extravagant claims have been
made by the Declaration of Santiago in
1952. This Declaration, after noting
that the former breadth of the territorial sea and of the contiguous zone
was inadequate, stated in part:
The Governments of Chile,
Ecuador and Peru proclaim as a
norm of their international maritime policy, the sovereignty and
exclusive jurisdiction that corresponds to each of them over the
sea off the coasts of their respeetive countries up to a minimum
distance of 200 marine miles.
The United States and the other
adherents of the three-mile rule have
never accepted this principle nor
acquiesced in the claims of sovereignty
over extended areas of the high seas.
While nations that have made these
claims do not now agree that three miles
is the maximum breadth of the territorial sea recognized in international
law, neither do they agree among themselves on any other limit.
A recent tally of the various claims
discloses the box score shown below.
Most of the States claiming in excess
of three miles have been motivated
by one of the following considerations: (1) the eeonomic advantages to
be gained by acquiring exclusive control over fishing in the waters adjacent to their coast; (2) the necessity
of keeping up with neighboring States
that have increased the breadth of
their territorial seas. An official of
one such State has stated quite
frankly that they had no real desire
to increase the breadth of their territorial sea, but felt bound to do so
since their neighbor, State "X," had
increased its territorial sea, and that if
State "X" would go back to three

miles so would they; (3) because of
considerations of security.
A broad territorial sea has a certain
superficial attraction to States looking
for means of keeping future wars away
from their door. If it could be assumed
that all belligerents would respect the
territorial sea of a neutral, certainly
twelve miles would serve this end better
than three miles. But, there are many
historical illustrations which demonstrate that belligerents have been less
than circumspect in their observance of
the sovereignty of neutral waters. Experience also shows that the broader the
territorial sea, the better haven it offers
to belligerent submarines seeking to
avoid detection by any enemy antisubmarine aircraft and surface vessels;
and the more usable it is a means of
moving to and fro from areas of the
high seas without risking contact with
enemy forces.
The Norwegian territorial sea created
just such a situation during the early
part of World War II, even though in
time of war Norway has claimed a
territorial sea of only three miles for
defense purposes. The British were concerned over ways of stopping the steady
stream of ships carrying contraband to
Germany and U-boats making way to
and from the high seas. It was of
importance to Germany to insure the
continued availability of this corridor as
a safe covered way to and from its home
waters. The result was the Invasion of
Norway in April, 1940.
Winston Churchill, reporting on the
event in the House of Commons, had
this to say:
The extraordinary configuration of the Norwegian western
coast provides l1 kind of corridor
or covered way, as every one
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knows, through which neutral
trade and German ships of all
kinds, warships and others, could
he moved to and fro through the
Allied hlockade within the territorial waters of Norway and
Sweden until they were under the
effective protection of the German air force in northern Germany ... The existence of this
geographical and legal covered
way has heen the greatest disadvantage which we have suffered,
and the greatest advantage which
Germany has possessed in her
efforts to frustrate the British and
Allied hlockade.
Russia and the Communist Bloc
claim a twelve-mile territorial sea. One
of the reasons the Communists desire a
hroad territorial sea was expressed hy
the Bulgarian delegate to the Sixth
Committee which met in New York last
Decemher. He said that such a hroad
helt was necessary in order to keep
foreign shipping from approaching close
enough to the shore to ohserve military
and naval installations.
Normally, States do not recognize
territorial seas greater than their own.
This ahsence of uniformity has heen the
source of much international friction
and increased tensions. For example,
many fishing vessels have heen seized
for violation of extended territorial seas.
In a great numher of instances the exact
position of the fishing vessel at the time
of the seizure was in dispute, and in
other instances the vessels were fishing
within nine or twelve miles from the
coast unintentionally and only hecause
of difficulty in determining exact position without having reference to the
shore line.
There was the case in 1950 of two
Swedish fishing hoats seized hy a Russian patrol craft in Danzig Bay, and
charged with fishing eleven and ten and
a half miles respectively from the coast,
in violation of Russia's twelve-mile
limit.

In 1954, Peru seized a whaling ship
of Panamanian registry approximately
one hundred miles at sea and levied a
fine of approximately $3,000,000 for
unauthorized whaling operations in
Peruvian territorial waters.
In 1955, two United States fishing
vessels were seized-one fourteen and
the other twenty-four miles off the
coast of Ecuador-and fined a total of
$49,000 for fishing without a permit in
Ecuadorian jurisdictional waters.
There have heen many instances of
Mexican authorities seizing United
States shrimp hoats on charges of
shrimping within the nine-mile territorial sea claimed hy Mexico.
Of course the ohvious effect of extending the territorial sea is to decrease
the area of the high seas; that is, the
area of the seas where there is freedom
of operation. The extent of that reduction is startling. Some three million
square miles of high seas would he lost
if the territorial sea were extended from
three to twelve miles. This is an area
three times as large as the Mediterranean. If a twelve-mile territorial sea
were applied to the Mediterranean, it
would take away over 13% of its open
water.
But the real significance of a hroadened territorial sea, from the standpoint
of our maritime and national defense
interests, hecomes apparent when we
consider some of the restrictions that
are imposed on the right to navigate
areas of the seas not included in the
high seas. Ships of all States have tRe
right of innocent passage through the
territorial seas. However, in order to
enjoy this right the passage must he
innocent; that is, a ship does not use t14e
territorial seas for committing any acts
prejudicial to the security of the coastal
State. On the other hand, the coastal
State may not hamper innocent passage.
It must give notice of any dangers to
navigation of which it has knowledge,
and is under the ohligation to use all
m~ans at its disposal to insure respect
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for innocent passage in its territorial sea.
But, in the interest of its own security, a
coastal State may temporarily suspend
innocent passage in definite areas and it
may designate specific courses for ships
to follow upon navigating the territorial
sea. The ship is bound to comply with
the rules and regulations imposed by the
coastal State concerning such passage
and may, under certain circumstances,
come within the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State.
I mention these various rights and
responsibilities to point out the fact
that although there is a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea,
it is subject to many possible interferences and harassments not to be
experienced on the high seas.
Thus, the extension of the territorial
sea could in many areas of the world
bring the sea lanes within the sovereignty of coastal States. Conceivably,
this could result in the lengthening of
sea lanes because of the unwillingness of
shippers to subject their vessels to possible interferences which are inherent in
the passage through the territorial sea.
This might well result in increasing
sailing time, and, hence, the cost of the
voyage.
While a warship is not subject to the
jurisdiction of a coastal State while it is
in a territorial sea, it is nevertheless
expected to comply with all security,
quarantine, and similar rules and regulations or face expulsion. But, more importan t, international law, as it
presently exists, does not forbid a
coastal State from subjecting the
passage of a warship through its territorial sea to prior authorization or
notification. Thus, there is no inherent
right of innocent passage for warships,
as in the case of merchantships.
Perhaps the basis for this principle
was stated by Mr. Elihu Root in the
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration when he said that warships may not
pass into the zone because they
threaten, but merchantships can pass

and repass because they do not
threaten. This same reasoning may be
responsible for the generally accepted
view that a submarine must remain on
the surface while navigating the territorial sea.
It is interesting to note that when the
International Law Commission met in
1954 it took the view that passage
should be granted to warships without
prior notice or authorization. The following year, the Commission modified
its position so as to stress the right of
the coastal State to make the right of
passage of warships through the territorial sea subject to previous notification or authorization. It is in this latter
form that the At ticle will be considered
by the Conference in 1958.
It is said that there is no controlling
practice of the United States regarding
the passage of our warships in foreign
waters or the passage of foreign warships in our waters. In determining a
position on this Article, it would be
expected that the recognized breadth of
the territorial sea would have a bearing
upon the conclusion reached. Conceivably, a State might be willing to accept
the view that innocent passage of a
warship may be subject to authorization
or notification if the territorial sea was
but three miles, and yet be unwilling to
adopt such a position if the territorial
sea were extended to, let us say, twelve
miles.
The rule as to the right of innocent
passage of warships is different when
the territorial sea comprises an international strait; that is, when it connects
two parts of the high seas and is used
for international navigation. In such a
case, innocent passage in time of peace
cannot be made the subject of either
authorization or notification. It is, of
course, the requirement for warships-as
well as for all other ships-that the
passage be innocent and that there be
compliance with the regulations issued
by the coastal State concerning the use
of a strait. This rule reflects the holding
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of the International Court of Justice in
the Corfu Channel case.
This right of innocent passage does
not exist unless the strait serves as a
connecting link, or as a means of communication hetween two parts of the
high seas. If the area of sea at either or
hoth ends of the strait does not have the
character of high seas, then the strait
does not meet the test of an international strait. This hecomes highly significant when we consider the possihle
effect of hroadened territorial seas.
As an example, let us consider the
Gulf of Aqaha. As you prohahly know,
the Gulf is approximately 125 miles
long and 14 miles wide at its widest
point It is connected to the Red Sea hy
the Strait of Tiran, which is wholly
within the territorial seas of Egypt and
Saudi Arahia. The Gulf is hound hy
Egypt, Saudi Arahia, Israel and Jordan.
On the hasis of a three-mile territorial
sea, there is an area of high seas within
the Gulf. Accordingly, under the rule of
the Corfu Channel case, the Strait of
Tiran constitutes an international strait,
and the right of innocent passage exists.
However, if a twelve-mile territorial sea
were to he recognized, then the Gulf
wmld he comprised entirely of the
territorial seas of the coastal States, and
the Strait would no longer have the
characteristics of an international strait.
Before considering the effect of extending the hreadth of the territorial sea
on other narrow passages hetween two
points of the high-seas, I want to invite
your attention to the status of aircraft
in international law. While an airplane
enjoys the freedom to fly over the high
seas, it does not have the right of
innocent passage over territorial waters.
This prohibition is not changed hecause
the territorial sea happens to he an
international strait, through which warships may sail as a matter of right Thus,
the extension of the territorial sea
would, in certain areas of the world,
deny aircraft access to large areas of
open water. Let me cite examples.

The Strait of Gihralter is seven miles
wide at its narrowest point. In the event
of the recognition of a territorial sea
greater than three miles, the entire
Strait would he within the territorial sea
of the coastal States. Thus, aircraft
would not have the right to fly from the
Atlantic into the Mediterranean without
getting permission from the coastal
States. The same result would occur in
the Strait of Bah el Mandeh, which
connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red
Sea.
If a twelve-mile territorial sea wcre
accredited to each of the islands in the
Aegean Sea, there would he a solid
harrier of territorial water over which an
airplane could not fly. Thus, an airplane
would he denied the right to fly from
any point in the Mediterranean to
points in the Aegean, or heyond. Similar
results would occur in the Straits connecting the Gulf of Pohai with the
Yellow Sea, and in several areas in the
Baltic.
The rule of international law relating
to the recognition of hays as internal
water determines the status of many
large areas of the sea. For instance,
when a hay is recognized as internal
water, and thus considered a part of the
territory of the coastal State, the territorial sea is measured from the outer
limits of the hay rather than from the
low-water mark along the sinuosities of
the coast. Thus, where this rule is
applied, it places within the exclusive
control of a State large areas of water
which would otherwise he high seas.
Normally, in order to he recognized
as internal water, a hay must possess
certain geographical characteristics. One
of the departures from the recognized
criteria proposed hy the International
Law Commission is an increase in the
allowahle width of the mouth of such a
hay from ten to fifteen miles. Here,
again, we see the influence of those who
desire to make it easier for States to
gain exclusive control over large areas of
the high seas.

301
In addition, a hay may he considered
internal water if it is a "historic" hay;
that is, where the claim is hased on a
prescriptive right gained hy reasons of
its geographical characteristics and
coupled with long usage and control.
The "historic hay" concept is suhject to
great ahuse, as where a State unilaterally
dcclares arcas of its coastal water to he
internal watcr and therehy excluded
from the areas of the high seas.
It was Icss than sixty days ago that
the Council of Ministers of Russia
announced thc estahlishment of Peter
the Great Bay as internal water, with
the territorial sea measured seaward
from the line running from the mouth
of the Tumen Rivcr to Cape Povorotny.
There was a further announcement that
navigation of foreign vessels and flights
of foreign aircraft in this area may now
take place only with the permission of
compctent Soviet authorities.
About three weeks later, the Associated Press reported from Tokyo this
vcry ominous news item: "Russia has
warned that J apanesc fishing hoats
coming within twelve miles of Russian
territory will he confiscated. "
From headland to headland, Peter
the Great Bay is 115 miles wide at its
mouth and 55 miles long. By this act,
Russia laid claim to roughly 2,000
square miles of high seas and closed off
traditionally important Japanese fishing
grounds in the Bay and in the adjoining
areas of the Sea of Japan. Of course this
Bay is not internal water, and cannot he
recognized as internal water under any
concept of international law.
The United States immediately protested, charging that the Russian decree
was an unlawful attempt to appropriate
a large area of the high seas hy unilateral
action; that such an attempt has no
foundation in international law, and
cncroaches upon the well-estahlished
principle of freedom of the seas.
In conclusion, I think it is significant
that many of the States asserting claims
arc not in fact interested in securing a

uniform hreadth of the high seas
throughout the world, even though it
might coincide with their particular
claims. What they really seek is the
hlanket sanction of international law to
estahlish whatever limit hest suits their
purpose at the time-whether it he
twelve miles, today, or a thousand miles
tomorrow.
This theory was hest illustrated in a
Soviet note which replied to our protest
in connection with the shooting down
of a B-29 in the Kurils in 1954:
Establishment of limits of territorial waters is regarded as within
the competence of the littoral
States, which define their extent
in accordance with their national
interests and also with interests of
international navigation.
Such a concept, if universally accepted, would produce chaos in the sea
lanes of the world. It would take us
hack to the era when Spain and Portugal
divided up the oceans hy degrees.
I think it also appears somewhat
incongruous that many of the most
sweeping assertions of sovereignty have
heen made hy the smaller nations,
possessing not the slightest means of the
enforcement of their claims. On the
other hand, the major maritime powers
who have the wherewithal are staunch
defenders of freedom of the seas.
It may he argued, as indeed it has
heen, that the three-mile rule is an
archaic doctrine-good for the days of
cannon shot and sailing ships, hut little
related to this era of guided missiles and
nuclear power. To meet the missile
threat, it has heen contended that we
should extend our sovereignty to fifteen
hundred miles and concentrate our efforts on patrolling the zone. On the
face, it is an appealing theory. In effect,
it is a retreat to the "Fortress of
America" concept. We could not long
survive in some magical island surrounded hy a world we abandoned to
hostile forces.
The hest defense is a good defense.
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Our system of collective security is a
maritime alliance dependent upon mohile forces and effective sea communications. Recent events in sensitive areas
demonstrate heyond the shadow of a

douht that the security of this country
and of the Free World can hest he
protected if the present areas of the high
seas remain open to our naval forces,
hoth on the surface and in the air.
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